Abstract-In this paper, we propose a new double-piped mode of operation for multiproperty-preserving domain extension of message authentication codes (MACs), pseudorandom functions (PRFs), and pseudorandom oracles (PROs). Our mode of operation performs twice as fast as the original double-piped mode of operation of Lucks while providing comparable security. Our construction, which uses a class of polynomial-based compression functions proposed by Stam, makes a single call to a 3n-bit to n-bit primitive f 1 at each iteration and uses a finalization function f 2 at the last iteration, producing an n-bit hash function 2 3 ) query complexity as long as 1 and 2 are public random functions. To our knowledge, our result constitutes the first time (2 ) unforgeability that has been achieved using only an unforgeable primitive of -bit output length. (Yasuda showed unforgeability of (2 5 6 ) for Lucks' construction assuming an unforgeable primitive, but the analysis is suboptimal, as noticed by us and others; in this paper, we also show how Yasuda's bound can be improved to (2 ).) In related work, we strengthen Stam's collision resistance analysis of polynomial-based compression functions (showing unforgeability of the primitive suffices) and discuss how to implement our mode by replacing 1 with a 2 -bit key blockcipher in Davies-Meyer mode or by replacing 1 with the cascade of two 2 -bit to -bit compression functions.
satisfying the following properties. 1) [ 1 2 ] is unforgeable up to (2 ) query complexity as long as 1 and 2 are unforgeable. 2) [ 1 2 ] is pseudorandom up to (2 ) query complexity as long as 1 is unforgeable and 2 is pseudorandom. 3) [ 1 2 ] is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to (2 2 3 ) query complexity as long as 1 and 2 are public random functions. To our knowledge, our result constitutes the first time (2 ) unforgeability that has been achieved using only an unforgeable primitive of -bit output length. (Yasuda showed unforgeability of (2 5 6 ) for Lucks' construction assuming an unforgeable primitive, but the analysis is suboptimal, as noticed by us and others; in this paper, we also show how Yasuda's bound can be improved to (2 ) .)
In related work, we strengthen Stam's collision resistance analysis of polynomial-based compression functions (showing unforgeability of the primitive suffices) and discuss how to implement our mode by replacing 1 with a 2 -bit key blockcipher in Davies-Meyer mode or by replacing 1 with the cascade of two 2 -bit to -bit compression functions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Merkle-Damgård transform has been the most popular method to build a cryptographic hash function from a fixed-size compression function. A major advantage of this construction is that it preserves collision resistance with an appropriate padding algorithm, allowing one to focus on the construction of secure compression functions. However, Joux [17] showed that if computing collisions becomes somehow feasible for the underlying compression function, then the hash function may fail worse than expected: for a hash function based on a compression function of -bit output, one can find a -multicollision only with complexity, which is much smaller than required for an ideal random function. This observation led to several generic attacks such as long-message second preimage attacks [19] and herding attacks [18] . Lucks observed that these weaknesses can be mitigated by increasing the size of the internal state and claimed that the internal state size should be seen as a security parameter of its own right [24] . Since a secure compression function of a larger output size might be harder to construct than the hash function itself, Lucks proposed to use a "narrow" compression function in a double-piped mode. In a subsequent paper [35] , Yasuda rigorously analyzed the security of the double-piped mode of operation as a multiproperty-preserving domain extension. Specifically, he showed that Lucks' double-piped mode of operation preserves unforgeability up to query complexity, and indistinguishability and indifferentiability both up to query complexity. Moreover, it was later noticed by several researchers that Yasuda's unforgeability bound could be increased to with a slightly modified proof (see Section VII). As such, Lucks' construction turned out to provide nearly optimal security. However, the fact that Lucks' compression function uses two applications of a (fairly strong) primitive remains a drawback. Stam [32] , [33] recently proposed a class of wide-pipe compression functions making a single call to an equivalent primitive (we call these polynomial-based compression functions). In this paper, we analyze the security properties of double-piped modes using Stam's polynomial-based compression functions, focusing on MAC-preservation, PRFpreservation, and PRO-preservation. Except for PRO-preservation (where we only achieve security), our bounds are comparable to those found by Yasuda for Lucks' original construction (and even better for unforgeability, given the sub-optimality of Yasuda's bound in that case, though the "corrected" unforgeability bound exceeds ours by a factor of ) even though our construction has twice the rate. 1 Besides performance, a second concern that arises for Lucks' double-pipe construction is the rather strong primitive it assumes: a -bit to -bit function (note that careful consider-ation is typically already given for the construction of -bit to -bit compression functions from smaller or more available primitives). Here, we also tackle this problem and show that our double-piped polynomial-based mode can be implemented with a blockcipher of -bit key in Davies-Meyer mode, in either the ideal-cipher model or the weaker "unpredictable cipher" model (see Section V) without significant loss of security. We also prove MAC-preservation and PRF-preservation for a compression function obtained by replacing the -bit to -bit primitive with the cascade of two -bit to -bit primitives. This latter result potentially opens the door to implementing the compression function with two calls to an -bit key blockcipher in Davies-Meyer mode (which would be the first time, to our knowledge, that a -bit to -bit compression function using two calls to an -bit key blockcipher is proved secure nearly up to the birthday bound). There currently seems to be no particular obstacle to achieving the latter result, except for the tediousness of the foreseeable analysis.
A. Construction and Results
To keep our construction generally comparable to Lucks' [24] and Yasuda's [35] , we discuss a hash function obtained by iterating a -bit to -bit compression function where the primitive used by the compression function is a -bit to -bit compression function (the "expected" setting of the parameters is ). The compression function is illustrated in Fig. 1 (a) for the case of a -bit to -bit compression function. (Throughout this paper, representation of polynomial evaluations is similar to the usual representation of blockciphers. An input to the triangle defines the coefficients of the polynomial, producing a mapping from to .) Let and let be the segmentation of into -bit blocks and a block of no more than bits (so ). Then is defined by where with all field operations taking place in (and being viewed as embedded in ). We call a polynomial-based compression function. This design is due to Stam [32] , [33] .
Given an independent -bit to -bit compression function , we define a hash function where , the Merkle-Damgård iteration of on message (with the usual "strengthened" padding for that appends the length of the message-see Section II for details). The scheme is pictured for in Fig. 1(b) . We comment at this point that our mode of operation uses two distinct primitives instead of a single primitive as do Lucks and Yasuda. As such, our construction explicitly follows the framework of An and Bellare [1] for proving unforgeability whereas Yasuda adopts it implicitly: with some extra work, one can use because the -queries are all independent from -queries with very high likelihood, as long as the leftmost bits of the IV are not all zero, due to the presence of the input segment. (This technique for reducing key material was first used by Maurer and Sjödin [28] .) We opt for using two primitives because it simplifies the proofs and allows separation of the security properties required by and (the security requirements for being often much less than those for ).
The following points summarize our results on and . For this summary, we say that is unforgeable to mean that a computationally bounded adversary with oracle access to has a low probability of predicting the output of on an unqueried value when is sampled from a keyed function family (as low as for a random function of the same range). is said to be weakly collision resistant if a computationally bounded adversary with oracle access to has a low probability of finding a collision when is sampled from a keyed function family. The query complexity of an attack on a variable input length (VIL) function is the number of queries to the underlying primitive necessary to compute the answers to the adversary's queries. 1) We prove that is collision resistant up to queries to as long as is unforgeable. This result also implies the collision resistance of against an information-theoretic adversary if is a random function. It also implies that is unforgeable up to query complexity as long as and are unforgeable, and that is weakly collision resistant up to query complexity as long as is unforgeable and is weakly collision resistant. 2) We prove that is pseudorandom up to query complexity as long as and are pseudorandom. In the complexity-theoretic model, we can weaken the assumption so that is unforgeable. 3) We prove that is preimage aware 2 up to query complexity as long as is a public random function. By the results of [9] , this implies that is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to query complexity as long as and are public random functions.
B. Refinements
As mentioned, we also investigate two variants of the -tobit polynomial-based compression function (a.k.a. the "quadratic" compression function) with a view toward concrete implementations of the mode. These alternate constructions are shown in Fig. 2 . The first variant replaces by a blockcipher of -bit key in Davies-Meyer mode. We show that this compression function is collision resistant up to queries as long as is "unpredictable," a notion we discuss in Section V. Similar corollaries follow on the security of the hash function obtained by iterating . The second is obtained by replacing with the cascade of two -bit to -bit compression functions and . We show that this compression function, denoted , is collision resistant up to queries as long as and are unforgeable. It follows that the hash function obtained by iterating (defined like but substituting for ) has unforgeability security up to query complexity when , , and are unforgeable, has collision security up to query complexity when , are unforgeable and is collision resistant, and is indistinguishable from a PRF up to query complexity when , are unforgeable and is pseudorandom.
C. Related Work
All the compression functions discussed in this paper, including the cascaded and blockcipher variants, were proposed by Stam [32] , [33] . In [33] , Stam proves the collision resistance of polynomial-based compression functions of degrees 2 and 3 in the random function model, and also proves the collision security of the quadratic blockcipher mode in the ideal cipher model. Here, our contribution is that we weaken the model by showing that collision resistance is already assured when and are unforgeable/unpredictable rather than random. (It is this weakening of the model that allows us to prove MACpreservation results for the resulting hash functions.) Regarding the quadratic cascade compression function, Stam proves collision resistance for a special class of nonadaptive adversaries assuming random primitives. Our analysis supports fully adaptive adversaries and once again weakens the model to unforgeable primitives.
Lucks [25] recently proposed a double-pipe hash function iterating a -bit to -bit compression function which, like the quadratic blockcipher-based mode, uses a single call to a blockcipher of -bit key. However, by contrast to the quadratic blockcipher compression function, Lucks' compression function is neither collision resistant nor preimage resistant. As a consequence, collision and preimage security can only be proved in the iteration (higher security notions like indifferentiability are unaddressed). On the other hand, for Lucks gives a better explicit collision security bound than we do for the quadratic blockcipher compression function: versus queries, respectively. As the first to formally study multiproperty-preserving domain extension, we refer to [2] and [3] . In particular, Bellare and Ristenpart [2] study domain extension for MACs, PRFs, and PROs in the dedicated key setting, similar to our analysis. Since then, various constructions for multiproperty-preserving domain extension have been proposed and analyzed [8] , [16] . However, most constructions are using single-piped modes of operation that provide security only up to the birthday bound (particularly in terms of MAC security). This paper can be seen as an extension of Yasuda's work [35] since our main achievement is to double the rate of that construction while maintaining comparable MAC-preservation and PRF-preservation properties. However, from a technical standpoint we owe most to Dodis and Steinberger [10] , whose "multicollision-to-forgery" (MTF) balls-in-bins games are used in nearly all of our analyses (the sole exception being the preimage awareness bound for polynomial-based compression functions). Indeed, the main "message" of this paper may well be the versatility and power of MTF games.
Recently, Dodis and Steinberger [11] have shown how to achieve beyond-birthday domain extension for MACs from noncompressing primitives. Their construction, however, remains mainly of theoretical interest, due to its inefficiency. Fig. 3(a) . In the experiment, an adversary has oracle access to and tries to produce a valid tag for a new message . Here, we call a message "new" if it has not been queried to oracle . The forgery advantage of is defined by
The probability is taken over the random choice of and 's coins (if any). We define as the maximum of over all adversaries making at most queries whose total combined length is at most bits (including the forgery produced by ) and of "running time" at most . The "running time" is defined to be the total running time of the experiment, including the time required to compute the answers to 's queries. We write for if is a family of fixed input length functions, as in this case is automatically determined by .
The WCR of is estimated by the experiment described in Fig. 3(b) . In contrast to the definition of collision resistance (in the dedicated-key setting) where is the provided key , is allowed only oracle access to . Let Then the WCR of , denoted , is defined to be the maximum of over all adversaries making at most queries whose total combined length is at most bits and of running time at most . When is a family of fixed input length functions, we likewise write instead of . Our security proof for unforgeability will follow the approach developed by An and Bellare [1] is the maximum number of queries to a member of required to compute for such that . Indifferentiability and Indistinguishability: In the indifferentiability framework, a distinguisher is given two systems and . Here, is an ideal primitive used as a building block for the construction of . An ideal primitive and a probabilistic Turing machine with oracle access to have the same interfaces as and , respectively. The simulator tries to emulate the ideal primitive so that no distinguisher can tell apart the two systems and with a significant probability, based on their responses to queries that the distinguisher may send. We say that the construction is indifferentiable from if the existence of such a simulator is proved. The indifferentiability guarantees universal composability of : if is indifferentiable from , then can replace in any cryptosystem, and the resulting cryptosystem is at least as secure under the assumption that is ideal as under the assumption that is ideal. For example, if an iterative hash function based on a fixed-size compression function is indifferentiable from a VIL random oracle in the FIL random oracle model, then the iterative hash function can replace the VIL random oracle in any cryptosystem, and the resulting cryptosystem remains secure in the FIL random oracle model if the original scheme was secure in the VIL random oracle model. 3 Now we give a formal definition of indifferentiability in the information-theoretic model. For a more comprehensive introduction of the indifferentiability framework, we refer to [6] and [27] .
Definition 1: A Turing machine with oracle access to an ideal primitive is said to be -indifferentiable from an ideal primitive if there exists a simulator of running time at most with oracle access to such that for any distinguisher making at most queries, it holds that If is a public random function, then is called a -pseudorandom oracle (PRO). If is not allowed to make queries for the underlying primitive, we obtain the definition of indistinguishability.
Definition 2:
A Turing machine with oracle access to an ideal primitive is said to be -indistinguishable from an ideal primitive if for any distinguisher making at most queries, it holds that If is a public random function, then is called a -pseudorandom function (PRF). The complexity-theoretic definition of indistinguishability is given as follows.
Definition 3:
A function family is said to be -indistinguishable from an ideal primitive if for any distinguisher making at most queries whose total combined length is at most bits and of running time at most , it holds that where key is chosen uniformly at random. If is a public random function, then is called a -PRF. Collision Resistance: Here, we review the definition of collision resistance in the information-theoretic model. Given a function and an information-theoretic adversary both with oracle access to an ideal primitive , the collision resistance of against is estimated by the experiment described in Fig. 4 . The experiment records every query-response pair that obtains by oracle queries into a query history . We write if contains all the query-response pairs required to compute . At the end of the experiment, is successful if it finds two distinct inputs yielding the same -output. The collision-finding advantage of is defined to be (3) 3 For the limitations of the indifferentiability framework, we refer to [30] . The probability is taken over the random choice of and 's coins (if any). For , we define as the maximum of over all adversaries making at most queries.
Preimage Awareness and Adaptive Preimage Resistance:
The notion of preimage awareness was first introduced by Dodis et al. [9] . This notion is useful for the proof of indifferentiability of "NMAC" type constructions. Let be a function with oracle access to an ideal primitive . In order to estimate the preimage awareness of , we use the experiment described in Fig. 5 . Here, an adversary is provided two oracles and . The oracle provides access to the ideal primitive and records a query history . Note that this oracle is implicitly used in the experiments for collision resistance and adaptive preimage resistance (to be defined later). The extraction oracle provides an interface to an extractor , which is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an element in the range of and the query history , and returns either or an element in the domain of . With respect to the extractor , we define the advantage of to be (4) The main application of preimage awareness lies in the construction of PROs. In the following lemma which is a combination of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in [9] , is an algorithm such that if is a valid output of and otherwise. For any algorithm , we write for the maximum time required to compute for any input such that . If is an algorithm with oracle access to an ideal primitive , then is the maximum number of queries to required to compute for any input such that . Without any constraint on the input length, we just write and .
Lemma 2:
Let be a function with oracle access to an ideal primitive and let and be public random functions for
. For an arbitrary extractor with respect to , there exists a simulator such that for any distinguisher making at most queries to the three oracle interfaces associated with , there exists an adversary such that Let be the length in bits of the longest query made by to its first oracle, and let . Then, simulator runs in time Adversary runs in time makes at most primitive queries, and makes at most extraction queries. The (information-theoretic) notion of adaptive preimage resistance, first introduced in [21] , is useful for the proof of preimage awareness. Given a function and an information-theoretic adversary both with oracle access to an ideal primitive , the adaptive preimage resistance of against is estimated by the experiment described in Fig. 6 . Similar to the experiment for collision resistance, the experiment keeps its query history . At any point during the experiment, the adversary is allowed to choose a commitment element in the range of such that the query history has not determined any preimage of . The experiment records the element into a commitment list . Queries and commitments are made in an arbitrarily interleaved order. At the end of the experiment, succeeds if it finds a preimage of some element in the commitment list. The adaptive preimage-finding advantage of is defined to be (5)
For
, we define as the maximum of over all adversaries that make at most queries and at most commitments.
Let be an algorithm that on input returns an element if there exists such that and otherwise. 4 Let where is the probability that , , and at the end of the experiment and is the probability that , , and at the end of the experiment. Then, can be regarded as a collision-finding adversary such that . Furthermore, can be transformed into an adaptive preimage-finding adversary such that : runs as a subroutine, asks the same primitive queries as , and makes commitments if makes a query for and has not determined any preimage of . If makes at most primitive queries and extraction queries, then it follows that and 4 What we described here for E is only the goal of the extractor. Its performance (or specific behavior) would depend on the scheme F [P ]: it might be information-theoretic or computationally efficient. . We record this observation as the following lemma.
Lemma 3:
Let be a function with oracle access to an ideal primitive . Then there exists an extractor such that for any adversary it holds that IV. SECURITY OF THE POLYNOMIAL-BASED MODE OF OPERATION For this section and the rest of this paper, and refer to the compression function and hash function defined in Section I. We use " " to denote the logarithm base 2. For simplicity of notation, we assume that is an integer for the number of queries . In large parts of this paper, we will write members of function families without ever making the key explicit.
A. WCR and Unforgeability
We begin with the proof of WCR for such that is randomly chosen from a function family .
Theorem 1:
Let be a function family defined by . Then where and is the time required to solve a univariate polynomial equation of degree over .
Remark 2: For a univariate polynomial of degree over , there is a deterministic algorithm to find zeros using field operations (ignoring factors). See [13] and [14] . In order to prove Theorem 1, we use a generalization of the MTF balls-in-bins game first introduced in [10] .
MTF Game: This game is played by two players and according to the following rules. Parameters are integers and . 1) The game consists of rounds. 2) At each round, publicly places a set of balls into a set of bins such that: a) balls placed at the same round go into distinct bins; b) the number of balls that are placed into bins already containing balls at the moment of placement is finite; c) some bin eventually contains more than balls.
3) Before each round, can secretly "pass" or "guess" a bin that will receive a ball in the next round. makes exactly one guess throughout the game.
4) If makes a correct guess, then wins. Otherwise, loses. Note that there is no constraint on the total number of balls or bins.
For , let be the total number of balls that are placed into bins that already have at least balls in them right before the round when the ball is placed. 5 Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Irrespective of 's strategy, there exists a strategy for to win the aforementioned game with probability at least . Proof: 's strategy is simple, as follows: 1) Choose a round and a level uniformly at random. 2) Immediately prior to the th round of the game, guess a bin uniformly at random from all bins containing at least balls already. For a given value of , each ball placed into a bin with at least balls in it already gives chance at least of winning since is an upper bound for the number of bins that have balls in them at the end of the game. Therefore, 's chance of winning is at least for a given value of , and hence 's overall chance of winning is at least where and denote arithmetic mean and geometric mean, respectively.
Note that Lemma 4 asserts nothing about 's efficiency-in fact, if a huge number of balls are thrown, it may be difficult to keep track of all bins that have received at least balls already (which is necessary for sampling uniformly among the bins). In our case, bins will often be curves defined by polynomials of degree over and balls points in , where a ball goes into bin if (a ball is thus "cloned" into many different bins). In this setting, it becomes easier to keep track of which bins have at least balls in them when , as points uniquely determine a polynomial of degree . Thus, for such a game it may be helpful to set , in order to keep the complexity of sampling under control. (Dodis and Steinberger do not have games in which the number of bins containing balls is so large that sampling for small values of is an issue, and always use MTF games with
.) The value of is then set large enough to make the term small. We typically upper bound by where is an upper bound on the total number of bins with at least balls at the end of the game. Indeed, because balls are thrown into 5 The number c depends only on A's strategy. Suppose that each ball in a bin is assigned a label in the order of placement into the bin -1, 2, 3, and so on. Then, c is the number of balls (through all the bins) that have labels greater than j at the end of the game. distinct bins at each round, this definition of implies that at each round at most balls are thrown into bins with balls in them already. We thus have the following corollary:
Corollary 1: If the number of bins that contain at least balls at the end of the MTF game is at most , then can win the MTF game with probability at least . We note that Corollary 1 is a bit wasteful, in the sense that it is possible to give a better bound for 's chance of success as a function of and from the relationship and the fact that 's chance of success is also lower bounded by where . However this gain leads to a more complicated statement and is minor enough for us to ignore. 6 Proof of where we know 0 < 1.
game. Then, when correctly guesses a bin that will receive the new ball , has a chance to forge with probability since the intersection of the curves associated with and contains at most elements. 7 Here, we assume the existence of an algorithm of running time to find zeros of a univariate polynomial of degree . Let , and . Since points determine a unique polynomial of degree fitting the points, we can apply Corollary 1 to obtain a forger of success probability (7) and of running time . Here, is the time required for sampling the curves containing at least points at each round. For each set of points obtained from the previous queries, computes a unique curve containing the points using -bit multiplications. From (6) and (7), it follows that
The following theorem is immediate from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. and . In the single-key setting, we assume that the leftmost bits of are not all zero. Then we can use the techniques employed in the CS construction [28] . The term comes from the case where for some message block and during the Merkle-Damgård iteration. 7 The ith round of this game begins at the moment when B relays the ith query from A to the oracle f . So, B can hold the ith query from A without relaying it to the oracle, and at the same time, make a guess of a bin that will receive a new ball at the ith round.
B. Collision Resistance and Indistinguishability
Let be the set of all functions from to . Then can be regarded as a function family by associating with for in some unambiguous manner. The WCR of defined by against a computationally unbounded adversary implies its collision resistance in the information-theoretic model (due to the equivalence of oracle access to either or ). Since for any and , the following theorem is immediate from Theorem 1.
Theorem 3:
If is a random function, then
The following lemma shows that any weakly collision resistant function can be combined with a random function producing a PRF. This lemma can be regarded as the PRF analog of Lemma 1 with the difference that here the finalization function is a random function instead of a secure MAC.
Lemma 5:
Let be a function family and let and be random functions. Then the composite function family is -indistinguishable from , where . Proof: We use the identical-until-bad game-hop strategy introduced in [4] . Let and be games with a single oracle, as defined in Fig. 7 . We can assume that a distinguisher makes no redundant query. Then whenever makes a query to in game , it will receive an independent random value in . It means that the oracle faithfully implements a random function in game . On the other hand, the oracle in game faithfully implements for a random function since only depends on the value . Flag sets to true only when makes a collision in . Therefore, for any -distinguisher , we have
Since the strengthened Merkle-Damgård transform preserves collision resistance, the aforementioned lemma implies that is pseudorandom up to query complexity as long as is unforgeable and is pseudorandom.
In the information-theoretic model, we can combine Theorem 3 and Lemma 5 to obtain the following theorem. In the single-key setting, we assume that the leftmost bits of are not all zero. Then, and are indistinguishable as long as does not make a call to such that the leftmost bits of the output are all zero. By Theorem 4, it follows that is -indistinguishable from .
C. Preimage Awareness and Indifferentiability
We begin with the proof of adaptive preimage resistance for where is a public random function. First, we slightly modify the experiment , so that is allowed to make a commitment whose preimage has already been determined. With respect to this commitment, we give a win to if a query made after the commitment determines a new evaluation of its preimage. (Note that each query to determines a unique evaluation of .) This modification is denoted by . Let be an "optimal" information-theoretic adversary of that makes at most queries and at most commitments. Then the maximum winning probability would not be smaller than . Note that does not need to check out the previous query-response pairs in order to avoid making a commitment whose preimage has been determined. And the probability distribution of the response to a certain query is independent of the previous query-response pairs (as long as does not make a redundant query). This observation allows us to assume that 's strategy does not depend on the responses of oracle to queries that sends. Therefore, in order to estimate , we can use the following game. (8) This implies that the number of curves that intersect with at points is less than . Thus, the winning probability of is upper-bounded by By Lemma 3, Theorem 3, and inequality we obtain the following theorem. Tightness of Indifferentiability: The preservation of indifferentiability is guaranteed only up to query complexity which is beyond the birthday bound but still far from optimal. This bound is dominated by the adaptive preimage resistance, depending on a configuration that consists of curves in and points on the curves (assuming ). If there exists a subfield of such that , then we have a configuration that provides tight adaptive preimage resistance: the set of points is and the set of curves consists of polynomials of degree with coefficients in . Even in this case, it is open whether the full construction is optimally indifferentiable or not. At least, the simulator would not be constructed in a straightforward manner. For the case where admits no proper subfield (e.g., with prime ), there also remains a question whether a similar configuration to tighten the bound exists or the bound can be qualitatively improved.
V. QUADRATIC BLOCKCIPHER-BASED COMPRESSION FUNCTION
In this section and the next, we discuss how to instantiate for (the "quadratic" polynomial mode) by replacing the -bit to -bit compression function with a smaller primitive. First, we discuss a concrete instantiation of the quadratic compression function using a blockcipher with -bit keys. Given , the compression function is defined by , where and for , , . In the quadratic blockcipher-based compression function, is implemented using a blockcipher , by letting as described in Fig. 2(a) . We write for the resulting compression function. Thus, and where
We can prove that provides similar security as the quadratic mode when instantiated with an ideal cipher , in terms of unforgeability, collision resistance, and pseudorandomness. In fact, our results do not actually necessitate an ideal cipher (which is a set of independent random permutations with one permutation per key) but only an "unpredictable" blockcipher . For the latter, all that is assumed is that it is difficult for an adversary to fully predict the output of an unqueried value. We call this the unpredictability of the blockcipher (which is similar to the unforgeability of a keyed function family, except no keys are involved) and we quantify it by the advantage which is the maximum over all adversaries running in time and making at most queries to of the probability that can output a tuple such that without making queries for or . Implicitly, depends on a sampling procedure for . In the ideal cipher model, is sampled uniformly at random among all -bit blockciphers with -bit keys. Here, we allow any sampling procedure for . Note that if is an ideal cipher, so we can always revert to that bound by assuming an ideal cipher. Our use of unpredictable blockciphers is somewhat similar to that of [10] , with the significant difference that the blockciphers of [10] use fixed keys, and that they are sampled by sampling the fixed keys. The unpredictability then corresponds to the unforgeability of a keyed function family (which happens to be a family of permutations).
We show that the collision resistance of can be effectively bounded in terms of . Let be the maximum probability that an adversary of running time with oracle access to and outputs a collision for which it has verified (i.e., has made the queries necessary to compute and ).
Theorem 7:
Let be the quadratic blockcipher-based compression function, where is sampled from the set of all -bit blockciphers with -bit keys according to an arbitrary fixed distribution. Then Furthermore, let be a function family where is chosen from a function family . Then, for
Remark 3: The term " ," which represents the time necessary to select a root of a quadratic polynomial over , is mainly kept to facilitate comparison with Theorem 1.
Proof: Let be a collision-finding adversary for of running time that makes queries and that achieves advantage . We make the standard assumption that never asks a query to which it knows the answer. We say "completes a query " to mean either that made a forward query resulting in the answer or that made an inverse query resulting in the answer . If completes two queries and such that we say that these queries are "colliding." A single query is "colliding" if it collides with some earlier query. We note that if then We consider each curve and as a distinct "bin," into which we will place balls as described later. (We emphasize that every -curve is considered a distinct bin from every -curve, even though they may consist of the same set of points in .) Say the adversary completes a query and let . Then, for every tuple such that , we place a ball in the bin if is actually a point on the curve , and we place a ball in the bin if is a point on . (Thus, the placement of balls in bins may be viewed as "highlighting" or selecting points on the curves.) We never "duplicate" (i.e., add or "highlight" twice) a ball inside a bin once it has already been added. We note that a query adds at most one ball to any bin, as cannot be modified without changing and vice versa.
To make matters a little more complicated, we finally define certain balls to be phantom balls. For a bin , the ball added by the inverse query is called a phantom ball, and for a bin , the ball added by the forward query is called a phantom ball. Therefore, at most one ball per bin is a phantom ball. Intuitively, phantom balls pose a problem because forecasting the appearance of a phantom ball in a bin does not imply being able to forecast the answer to a query. Thankfully, there are few phantom balls per bin.
We let be the maximum number of nonphantom balls in a bin at the end of the attack (which differs at most by 1 from the maximum total number of balls in a bin). By assumption that finds a collision with probability , one of the following two events occurs with probability at least . (9) A similar argument treats forward queries. Note that it takes time to enumerate the balls in a given bin or . Case 2. Produces : For this case, attempts to forge the value of by using the MTF game played only with the nonphantom balls. We set and ; we are guaranteed that some bin contains more than balls at the end since is the number of nonphantom balls. To apply Corollary 1, we need to upper bound , the number of bins that have at least three balls at the end of the game. For this purpose, note that if a completed query adds a ball where to a bin , then is a point on the curve Thus, three noncolliding queries that produce balls in the same bin must each determine distinct values and, thus, uniquely determine the curve and the bin . Therefore, the number of -bins with three or more balls is at most . As a similar argument applies for -bins, we have . We also need to check that if correctly guesses a bin for an oncoming ball, then can actually use this guess to forge the value of or . Assume that the adversary has made a forward query and that has correctly guessed this query which will result in a new ball being placed in the bin . The values which are unknown to are and . The constraints are and which is where . As long as this polynomial in is nonzero, can guess the right root with probability and solve for using . (If the polynomial is a nonzero constant, it simply means that the original system is not solvable, and that guessed the wrong bin.) But if , we precisely obtain (the second case of) a phantom ball, so could not guess this ball anyway. Similarly in the case where makes an inverse query and correctly guesses the query will result in a new ball being added to a bin ; can always forge with probability because of the exclusion of (the first type of) phantom balls. Finally, in the remaining two combinations (forward query and -bin guess or inverse query and -bin guess) can also forge with probability using the stipulation , as is not hard to see. By Corollary 1, has forgery advantage (10) From (9) and (10), it follows that where is the overhead of the forger for the second case. Now the second part of the theorem is immediate from Lemma 1.
If is an ideal cipher, then for any and . Therefore, by Theorem 7 and Lemma 5, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 8:
Let be an ideal blockcipher and let be a random function. Then for , , where
Furthermore, is -indistinguishable from a random function , where for the length in bits of the longest query made by a distinguisher.
For example, for , Theorem 8 yields that . Table I compares the threshold number of queries such that for various blockcipher-based double-block-length hash functions with . 
VI. QUADRATIC CASCADE COMPRESSION FUNCTION
In this section, we discuss a concrete instantiation of the quadratic compression function (polynomial-based compression function of degree ) using the cascade of two functions. In the quadratic cascade compression function, the compression function is implemented by the cascade of two compression functions by letting as described in Fig. 8 . We write for the resulting compression function. Thus, and , where and .
Theorem 9:
Let be a function family where and are independently chosen from a function family , respectively. Then Furthermore, let be a function family where is chosen from a function family . Then, for
In order to prove Theorem 9, we slightly modify the MTF game described in Section IV by allowing a bin to receive a multiple number of balls at each round. By "collapsing" all balls introduced into a bin at a given round into a single ball, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6: If 1) each bin receives at most balls at each round; 2) the number of bins that contain at least balls at the end of the MTF game is at most ; and 3) some bin eventually contains more than balls, then can win the MTF game with probability at least .
Proof of Theorem 9:
Let be a weak-collision finding adversary for such that
Without loss of generality, we give direct oracle access to and , allowing at most queries to and queries to . Due to this assumption, the collision resistance of in the ideal primitive model is derived from this theorem. We also assume that makes the queries necessary to verify its collision.
We construct a forging adversary for the function family from . The adversary has oracle access to a single member of . First, flips a coin and samples a random key . If the coin is heads, simulates by answering 's queries with and ; otherwise, simulates by answering 's queries with and . Then, "forgets" which of the two worlds it is in, treating both and as oracles and attempting to forge either one of them-note that since the two worlds are indistinguishable once "forgets" its choice, a successful forgery in the new two-oracle model gives a successful forgery of with probability . We now define 13 is the event that finds a collision. By assumption that succeeds to find a collision with probability , one of the events occurs with probability at least . For each event, we will construct a forger of either or , and analyze its success probability under the condition of the event. Especially, eight of these events use MTF games. For these games, each ball comes with a "label" which may be a query, a tuple of queries, or any other string. By convention, balls with the same label are never added twice to a bin: replicates do not contribute. We also stress that does not need to or guess the labels of balls, but only to guess a bin that is going to receive a ball as the result of the answer to 's last query.
: plays a balls-in-bins game where bins are values and balls are queries to , where a query goes in bin if . The parameters for the game are , , , and . Here, forgery follows obviously from the game: guessing a bin for a ball is guessing . By Lemma 6, the success probability of is at least . : Similar to the first case, we can construct a forger of with success probability at least . : (Not a balls-in-bins game.) uniformly selects an index between 1 and and at the th query to ; guesses that the answer will be . Then, has chance at least of forging .
: ). Therefore, the number of bins with more than balls is at most . Since some bin eventually contains more than balls, the success probability of for the balls-in-bins game is at least Once guesses that a query will go into bin , selects at random one of the two roots of the quadratic equation (using ), and guesses that this will be the output of . Therefore, the overall probability of success is at least , since has chance at least of choosing the right root if it guesses the right bin.
: plays a balls-in-bins game where bins are tuples with and balls are pairs such that for each -query . A ball goes into bin if . Since a query can only add at most one pair to any bin, we have . Let and . Since three distinct balls , , can simultaneously appear in at most one bin, the number of bins with more than balls at the end of the game is at most . Since some bin eventually contains more than balls, the success probability of for the balls-in-bins game is at least . Once guesses that a query will go into bin , selects at random one of the two roots of the quadratic equation (using ), and guesses that this will be the output of . Therefore, the overall success probability of is at least . In the following theorem, we record the information-theoretic collision resistance result of the quadratic cascade function, and state the indistinguishability result of the full construction implied by Lemma 5. In order to briefly see what loss one pays when moving from an original polynomial-based compression function to a blockcipher-based variant or to a cascade variant (in the ideal primitive model), we could compare the threshold number of queries such that the adversarial collision-finding advantage is less than for these three constructions. With typical parameters and , these numbers are for an original construction, for a blockcipher-based variant, and for a cascade variant, by Theorem 3, 8, and 10, respectively. So we note that Theorem 10 provides a relatively less tight upper bound on the collision-finding advantage.
VII. IMPROVED ANALYSIS OF LUCKS' DOUBLE-PIPED MODE OF OPERATION
We begin with the definition of Lucks' double-piped mode of operation (with a slight modification). Given a bit function and a nonzero constant , we define the following compression function:
The pictorial description of is shown in Fig. 9 . Given and an independent compression function Lucks' mode of operation defines a hash function where . Now we prove the WCR of where is chosen from a function family .
Theorem 11:
Let be a function family defined by as described previously. Then, Proof: Let be a weak collision-finding adversary such that
We can assume that makes no redundant query. We also assume that makes a query (for free) right after it has made a query . In fact, is able to compute without making a query, once it has made a query . We call a pair of queries a cycle. Using the techniques employed in the CS construction [28] , we can prove that Lucks' mode of operation using a single key also preserves unforgeability up to query complexity, improving the bound proved by Yasuda [35] .
